Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995

Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995
246 SCRA 511

FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together with the following conditions:
a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and any income from that land shall be put in the fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez Campus Fund”.

However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance & damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions. The heirs also argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land owned by the latter.

Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed.

ISSUE:
1) WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of petitioner’s certificate of title without a fixed period when to comply with such conditions? YES
2) WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO

HELD:

1)
Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is such a resolutory one. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may be revoked & all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.

More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.

2)
Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature & circumstance it can be inferred that the period was intended, the court may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith & such period has arrived. However, this general rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different set of circumstances existing more than a reasonable period of 50yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality & would serve no purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission before the court unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance there is no more obstacle for the court to decree recission.

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY vs. DEL ROSARIO 335 SCRA 288

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY vs. DEL ROSARIO
335 SCRA 288

FACTS:

Spouses Vicente & Maria Del Rosario jointly & severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a promissory note for P138,948.

Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed to pay their obligation.

Petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of sum of money before the RTC.

Trial court dismissed the complaint for the evidence presented were merely hearsay.

CA reversed & remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner claims that respondents are liable for the whole amount of their debt and the interest thereon, after they defaulted on the monthly installments. Respondents counter that the installments were not yet due and demandable. They theorize that the action for immediate enforcement of their obligation is premature because its fulfillment is dependent on the sole will of the debtor. Hence, they consider that the proper court should first fix a period for payment, pursuant to Articles 1180 and 1197 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

WON the installments had already became due and demandable? YES

HELD:

The act of leaving blank space the due date of the first installment did not necessary mean that the debtors were allowed to pay as & when they could. If this was the intention of the parties, they should have so indicated in the promissory note. However, it did not reflect any such intention.

While the specific date on which each installment would be due was left blank, the note clearly provided that each installment should be payable each month.

Furthermore, it also provided for an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, both of which showed the intention of the parties that the installment should be paid at a definite date. Had they intended that the debtors could pay as & when they could, there would have been no need for these 2 clauses.

The installments had already became due & demandable is bolstered by the fact that respondents started paying installments on the promissory note. The obligation of the respondents had matured & they clearly defaulted when their checks bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month after the date of the note because the check representing their first installment bounced.