NATURE OF
THE CASE:
Petitions
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),
insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any
elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than
the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and
Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now
come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title.
According to the
petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the
dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run
for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to
the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also
assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus
Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar
limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.
– Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign
for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand,
Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials
remains - they are still considered ipso facto
resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
Finally,
the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good
law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of
the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate
on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the
respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for
not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during
the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto
resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
W/N Section
16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well
as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes
effective.
HELD:
To
determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down
the rule that –
Constitutional
provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be
so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the
title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need
not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title
of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The
Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be
a complete index of its content.
The purported
dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not
violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.
The
legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of
harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The
executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the
Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and
in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it
would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern
of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government. It is
not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is
based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for
the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not
suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress
is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra
upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same
case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it
imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby
enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and
orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Substantial
distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally,
the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which
provides that it “shall take effect immediately upon its approval,” is
defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this
Court laid down the rule:
... the clause
“unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous
publication.
Publication
is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….
Following
Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express
statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In
conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles
in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor
delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of
the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative power. No such
transgression has been shown in this case.
