TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)
FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.YES
RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
Monday, December 20, 2010
Tan, Tiong, Tick vs. American Hypothecary Co., G.R. No. L-43682 March 31, 1938
Tan, Tiong, Tick v. American Hypothecary (case digest)
In Re Liquidation of Mercantile Bank of China.
TAN TIONG TICK, claimant-appellant, vs. AMERICAN APOTHECARIES CO., ET AL., claimants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-43682 March 31, 1938
DOCTRINES:
1.The bank can make use as its own the money deposited.
2.Current account and savings deposts are not preferred credits in case of insolvency and liquidation.
3.The bank can offset the deposit of the client who has a debt with the bank.
4.Deposits should not earn interest from the time the bank cease to do business. IMPERIAL, J.:
Facts:
In the proceedings for the liquidation of the Mercantile Bank of China, the appellant presented a written claim alleging: that when this bank ceased to operate on September 19, 1931, his current account in said bank showed a balance of P9,657.50 in his favor; that on the same date his savings account in the said bank also showed a balance in his favor of P20,000 plus interest then due amounting to P194.78; that on the other hand, he owed the bank in the amount of P13,262.58, the amount of the trust receipts which he signed because of his withdrawal from the bank of certain merchandise consigned to him without paying the drafts drawn upon him by the remittors thereof; that the credits thus described should be set off against each other according to law, and on such set off being made it appeared that he was still the creditor of the bank in the sum of P16,589.70. And he asked that the court order the Bank Commissioner to pay him the aforesaid balance and that the same be declared as preferred credit. The claim was referred to the commissioner appointed by the court, who at the same time acted as referee, and this officer recommended that the balance claimed be paid without interest and as an ordinary credit. The court approved the recommendation and entered judgment in the accordance therewith. The claimant took an appeal.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the current account and savings deposits are preferred credits in cases involving insolvency and liquidation of the bank.
2.Whether or not the deposits could be offset with the debt of the depositor with the bank.
3.Whether or not the deposits should earn interest from the time the bank ceased to operate.
RULING:
1.The SC ruled that, these deposits are essentially merchantile contracts and should, therefore, be governed by the provisions of the Code of Commerce. In accordance with article 309, the so-called current account and savings deposits have lost the character of deposits properly so-called, and are converted into simple commercial loans, because the bank disposed of the funds deposited by the claimant for its ordinary transactions and for the banking business in which it was engaged. That the bank had the authority of the claimant to make use of the money deposited on current and savings account is deducible from the fact that the bank has been paying interest on both deposits, and the claimant himself asks that he be allowed interest up to the time when the bank ceased its operations. Moreover, according to section 125 of the Corporation Law and 9 of Act No. 3154, said bank is authorized to make use of the current account, savings, and fixed deposits provided it retains in its treasury a certain percentage of the amounts of said deposits.
2.It appears that even after the enactment of the Insolvency Law there was no law in this jurisdiction governing the order or preference of credits in case of insolvency and liquidation of a bank. But the Philippine Legislature subsequently enacted Act No. 3519, amended various sections of the Revised Administrative Code, which took effect on February 20, 1929, and section 1641 of this latter Code. as amended by said Act provides:
SEC. 1641. Distribution of assets. — In the case of the liquidation of a bank or banking institution, after payment of the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable expenses, commissions and fees of the Bank Commissioner, to be allowed by the court, the Bank Commissioner shall pay the debts of the institution, under of the court in the order of their legal priority.
From this section 1641 we deduce that the intention of the Philippine Legislature, in providing that the Bank Commissioner shall pay the debts of the company by virtue of an order of the court in the order of their priority, was to enforce the provisions of section 48, 49 and 50 of the Insolvency Law in the sense that they are made applicable to cases of insolvency or bankruptcy and liquidation of banks. No other deduction can be made from the phrase “in the order of their legal priority” employed by the law, for there being no law establishing any priority in the order of payment of credits, the legislature could not reasonably refer to any legislation upon the subject, unless the interpretation above stated is accepted.
Examining now the claims of the appellant, it appears that none of them falls under any of the cases specified by section 48, 49 and 50 of the Insolvency Law; wherefore, we conclude that the appellant’s claims, consisting of his current and savings account, are not preferred credits.
3. “It may be stated as a general rule that when a depositor is indebted to a bank, and the debts are mutual — that is, between the same parties and in the same right — the bank may apply the deposit, or such portion thereof as may be necessary, to the payment of the debt due it by the depositor, provided there is no express agreement to the contrary and the deposit is not specially applicable to some other particular purposes.” (7 Am. Jur., par. 629, p.455; United States vs. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U.S., 387; National Bank vs. Morgan, 207 Ala.., 65; Bank of Guntersville vs. Crayter, 199 Ala., 699; Tatum vs. Commercial Bank & T. Co., 193 Ala., 120; Desha Bank & T. Co. vs. Quilling, 118 Ark., 114; Holloway vs. First Nat. Bank, 45 Idaho, 746; Wyman vs. Ft. Dearborn Nat Bank, 181 Ill., 279; Niblack vs. Park Nat. Bank, 169 Ill., 517; First Nat Bank vs. Stapf., 165 Ind., 162; Bedford Bank vs. Acoam, 125 Ind., 584.) The situation referred to by the appellees is inevitable because section 1639 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3519, provides that the Bank Commissioner shall reduce the assets of the bank into cash and this cannot be done without first liquidating individually the accounts of the debtors of said bank, and in making this individual liquidation the debtors are entitled to set off, by way of compensation, their claims against the bank.
4. Upon this point a distinction must be made between the interest which the deposits should earn from their existence until the bank ceased to operate, and that which they may earn from the time the bank’s operations were stopped until the date of payment of the deposits. As to the first class, it should be paid because such interest has been earned in the ordinary course of the bank’s business and before the latter has been declared in a state or liquidation. Moreover, the bank being authorized by law to make us of the deposits, with the limitation stated, to invest the same in its business and other operations, it may be presumed that it bound itself to pay interest to the depositors as in fact it paid interest prior to the date of the said claims.
As to the interest which may be charged from the date the bank ceased to do business because it was declared in a state of liquidation, SC held that the said interest should not be paid. Under articles 1101 and 1108 of the Civil Code, interest is allowed by way of indemnity for damages suffered, in the cases wherein the obligation consists in the payment of money. In view of this, SC held that in the absence of any express law or any applicable provision of the Code of Commerce, it is not proper to pay this last kind of interest to the appellant upon his deposits in the bank, for this would be anomalous and unjustified in a liquidation or insolvency of a bank. This rule should be strictly observed in the instant case because it is understood that the assets should be prorated among all the creditors as they are insufficient to pay all the obligations of the bank.
In view of all the foregoing considerations, SC affirmed the part of the appealed decision for the reasons stated herein, and it is ordered that the net claim of the appellant, amounting to P13,611.21, is an ordinary and not a preferred credit, and that he is entitled to charge interest on said amount up to September 19, 1931.
In Re Liquidation of Mercantile Bank of China.
TAN TIONG TICK, claimant-appellant, vs. AMERICAN APOTHECARIES CO., ET AL., claimants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-43682 March 31, 1938
DOCTRINES:
1.The bank can make use as its own the money deposited.
2.Current account and savings deposts are not preferred credits in case of insolvency and liquidation.
3.The bank can offset the deposit of the client who has a debt with the bank.
4.Deposits should not earn interest from the time the bank cease to do business. IMPERIAL, J.:
Facts:
In the proceedings for the liquidation of the Mercantile Bank of China, the appellant presented a written claim alleging: that when this bank ceased to operate on September 19, 1931, his current account in said bank showed a balance of P9,657.50 in his favor; that on the same date his savings account in the said bank also showed a balance in his favor of P20,000 plus interest then due amounting to P194.78; that on the other hand, he owed the bank in the amount of P13,262.58, the amount of the trust receipts which he signed because of his withdrawal from the bank of certain merchandise consigned to him without paying the drafts drawn upon him by the remittors thereof; that the credits thus described should be set off against each other according to law, and on such set off being made it appeared that he was still the creditor of the bank in the sum of P16,589.70. And he asked that the court order the Bank Commissioner to pay him the aforesaid balance and that the same be declared as preferred credit. The claim was referred to the commissioner appointed by the court, who at the same time acted as referee, and this officer recommended that the balance claimed be paid without interest and as an ordinary credit. The court approved the recommendation and entered judgment in the accordance therewith. The claimant took an appeal.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the current account and savings deposits are preferred credits in cases involving insolvency and liquidation of the bank.
2.Whether or not the deposits could be offset with the debt of the depositor with the bank.
3.Whether or not the deposits should earn interest from the time the bank ceased to operate.
RULING:
1.The SC ruled that, these deposits are essentially merchantile contracts and should, therefore, be governed by the provisions of the Code of Commerce. In accordance with article 309, the so-called current account and savings deposits have lost the character of deposits properly so-called, and are converted into simple commercial loans, because the bank disposed of the funds deposited by the claimant for its ordinary transactions and for the banking business in which it was engaged. That the bank had the authority of the claimant to make use of the money deposited on current and savings account is deducible from the fact that the bank has been paying interest on both deposits, and the claimant himself asks that he be allowed interest up to the time when the bank ceased its operations. Moreover, according to section 125 of the Corporation Law and 9 of Act No. 3154, said bank is authorized to make use of the current account, savings, and fixed deposits provided it retains in its treasury a certain percentage of the amounts of said deposits.
2.It appears that even after the enactment of the Insolvency Law there was no law in this jurisdiction governing the order or preference of credits in case of insolvency and liquidation of a bank. But the Philippine Legislature subsequently enacted Act No. 3519, amended various sections of the Revised Administrative Code, which took effect on February 20, 1929, and section 1641 of this latter Code. as amended by said Act provides:
SEC. 1641. Distribution of assets. — In the case of the liquidation of a bank or banking institution, after payment of the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable expenses, commissions and fees of the Bank Commissioner, to be allowed by the court, the Bank Commissioner shall pay the debts of the institution, under of the court in the order of their legal priority.
From this section 1641 we deduce that the intention of the Philippine Legislature, in providing that the Bank Commissioner shall pay the debts of the company by virtue of an order of the court in the order of their priority, was to enforce the provisions of section 48, 49 and 50 of the Insolvency Law in the sense that they are made applicable to cases of insolvency or bankruptcy and liquidation of banks. No other deduction can be made from the phrase “in the order of their legal priority” employed by the law, for there being no law establishing any priority in the order of payment of credits, the legislature could not reasonably refer to any legislation upon the subject, unless the interpretation above stated is accepted.
Examining now the claims of the appellant, it appears that none of them falls under any of the cases specified by section 48, 49 and 50 of the Insolvency Law; wherefore, we conclude that the appellant’s claims, consisting of his current and savings account, are not preferred credits.
3. “It may be stated as a general rule that when a depositor is indebted to a bank, and the debts are mutual — that is, between the same parties and in the same right — the bank may apply the deposit, or such portion thereof as may be necessary, to the payment of the debt due it by the depositor, provided there is no express agreement to the contrary and the deposit is not specially applicable to some other particular purposes.” (7 Am. Jur., par. 629, p.455; United States vs. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U.S., 387; National Bank vs. Morgan, 207 Ala.., 65; Bank of Guntersville vs. Crayter, 199 Ala., 699; Tatum vs. Commercial Bank & T. Co., 193 Ala., 120; Desha Bank & T. Co. vs. Quilling, 118 Ark., 114; Holloway vs. First Nat. Bank, 45 Idaho, 746; Wyman vs. Ft. Dearborn Nat Bank, 181 Ill., 279; Niblack vs. Park Nat. Bank, 169 Ill., 517; First Nat Bank vs. Stapf., 165 Ind., 162; Bedford Bank vs. Acoam, 125 Ind., 584.) The situation referred to by the appellees is inevitable because section 1639 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3519, provides that the Bank Commissioner shall reduce the assets of the bank into cash and this cannot be done without first liquidating individually the accounts of the debtors of said bank, and in making this individual liquidation the debtors are entitled to set off, by way of compensation, their claims against the bank.
4. Upon this point a distinction must be made between the interest which the deposits should earn from their existence until the bank ceased to operate, and that which they may earn from the time the bank’s operations were stopped until the date of payment of the deposits. As to the first class, it should be paid because such interest has been earned in the ordinary course of the bank’s business and before the latter has been declared in a state or liquidation. Moreover, the bank being authorized by law to make us of the deposits, with the limitation stated, to invest the same in its business and other operations, it may be presumed that it bound itself to pay interest to the depositors as in fact it paid interest prior to the date of the said claims.
As to the interest which may be charged from the date the bank ceased to do business because it was declared in a state of liquidation, SC held that the said interest should not be paid. Under articles 1101 and 1108 of the Civil Code, interest is allowed by way of indemnity for damages suffered, in the cases wherein the obligation consists in the payment of money. In view of this, SC held that in the absence of any express law or any applicable provision of the Code of Commerce, it is not proper to pay this last kind of interest to the appellant upon his deposits in the bank, for this would be anomalous and unjustified in a liquidation or insolvency of a bank. This rule should be strictly observed in the instant case because it is understood that the assets should be prorated among all the creditors as they are insufficient to pay all the obligations of the bank.
In view of all the foregoing considerations, SC affirmed the part of the appealed decision for the reasons stated herein, and it is ordered that the net claim of the appellant, amounting to P13,611.21, is an ordinary and not a preferred credit, and that he is entitled to charge interest on said amount up to September 19, 1931.
MARIO FL. CRESPO, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Crespo vs. Mogul
G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.
3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court.
5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course.
6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.
9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that “the motion’s trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”
10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals.
11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979.
12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980.
13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?
RULING: YES.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.
3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court.
5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course.
6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.
9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that “the motion’s trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”
10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals.
11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979.
12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980.
13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?
RULING: YES.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB ET. AL, G.R. No. 176864. Dec. 14, 2010
GR No. 176389
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
December 14, 2010
Facts:
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations.
On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.
The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.
The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
Controlling Issues:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
Other Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence; and
2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister.
Held:
The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.
They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Suspicious Details
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.
Webb’s U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a documented alibi.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
Effect of Webb’s alibi to others
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
Conclusion
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
December 14, 2010
Facts:
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations.
On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.
The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.
The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
Controlling Issues:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
Other Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence; and
2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister.
Held:
The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.
They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Suspicious Details
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.
Webb’s U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a documented alibi.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
Effect of Webb’s alibi to others
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
Conclusion
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 82508 September 29, 1989
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 82508 September 29, 1989
Facts:
Spouses Sy Bang were engaged in the sale of gravel produced from crushed rocks and used for construction purposes. In order to increase their production, they looked for a rock crusher which Rizal Consolidated Corporation then had for sale. A brother of Sy Bang, went to inspect the machine at the Rizal Consolidated’s plant site. Apparently satisfied with the machine, the private respondents signified their intent to purchase the same.
Since he does not have the financing capability, Sy Bang applied for financial assistance from Filinvest Credit Corporation. Filinvest agreed to extend financial aid on the following conditions: (1) that the machinery be purchased in the petitioner’s name; (2) that it be leased with option to purchase upon the termination of the lease period; and (3) that Sy Bang execute a real estate mortgage as security for the amount advanced by Filinvest. A contract of lease of machinery (with option to purchase) was entered into by the parties whereby they to lease from the petitioner the rock crusher for two years. The contract likewise stipulated that at the end of the two-year period, the machine would be owned by Sy Bang.
3 months from the date of delivery, Sy Bang claiming that they had only tested the machine that month, sent a letter-complaint to the petitioner, alleging that contrary to the 20 to 40 tons per hour capacity of the machine as stated in the lease contract, the machine could only process 5 tons of rocks and stones per hour. They then demanded that the petitioner make good the stipulation in the lease contract. Sy Bang stopped payment on the remaining checks they had issued to the petitioner.
As a consequence of the non-payment, Filinvest extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage.
Issue:
WON the real transaction was lease or sale? SALE ON INSTALLMENTS.
Held:
The real intention of the parties should prevail. The nomenclature of the agreement cannot change its true essence, i.e., a sale on installments. It is basic that a contract is what the law defines it and the parties intend it to be, not what it is called by the parties. It is apparent here that the intent of the parties to the subject contract is for the so-called rentals to be the installment payments. Upon the completion of the payments, then the rock crusher, subject matter of the contract, would become the property of the private respondents. This form of agreement has been criticized as a lease only in name.
Sellers desirous of making conditional sales of their goods, but who do not wish openly to make a bargain in that form, for one reason or another, have frequently resorted to the device of making contracts in the form of leases either with options to the buyer to purchase for a small consideration at the end of term, provided the so-called rent has been duly paid, or with stipulations that if the rent throughout the term is paid, title shall thereupon vest in the lessee. It is obvious that such transactions are leases only in name. The so-called rent must necessarily be regarded as payment of the price in installments since the due payment of the agreed amount results, by the terms of bargain, in the transfer of title to the lessee.
Indubitably, the device contract of lease with option to buy is at times resorted to as a means to circumvent Article 1484, particularly paragraph (3) thereof.Through the set-up, the vendor, by retaining ownership over the property in the guise of being the lessor, retains, likewise, the right to repossess the same, without going through the process of foreclosure, in the event the vendee-lessee defaults in the payment of the installments. There arises therefore no need to constitute a chattel mortgage over the movable sold. More important, the vendor, after repossessing the property and, in effect, canceling the contract of sale, gets to keep all the installments-cum-rentals already paid.
Even if there was a contract of sale, Filinvest is still not liable because Sy Bang is presumed to be more knowledgeable, if not experts, on the machinery subject of the contract, they should not therefore be heard now to complain of any alleged deficiency of the said machinery. It was Sy Bang who was negligent, not Filinvest. Further, Sy Bang is precluded to complain because he signed a Waiver of Warranty.
G.R. No. 82508 September 29, 1989
Facts:
Spouses Sy Bang were engaged in the sale of gravel produced from crushed rocks and used for construction purposes. In order to increase their production, they looked for a rock crusher which Rizal Consolidated Corporation then had for sale. A brother of Sy Bang, went to inspect the machine at the Rizal Consolidated’s plant site. Apparently satisfied with the machine, the private respondents signified their intent to purchase the same.
Since he does not have the financing capability, Sy Bang applied for financial assistance from Filinvest Credit Corporation. Filinvest agreed to extend financial aid on the following conditions: (1) that the machinery be purchased in the petitioner’s name; (2) that it be leased with option to purchase upon the termination of the lease period; and (3) that Sy Bang execute a real estate mortgage as security for the amount advanced by Filinvest. A contract of lease of machinery (with option to purchase) was entered into by the parties whereby they to lease from the petitioner the rock crusher for two years. The contract likewise stipulated that at the end of the two-year period, the machine would be owned by Sy Bang.
3 months from the date of delivery, Sy Bang claiming that they had only tested the machine that month, sent a letter-complaint to the petitioner, alleging that contrary to the 20 to 40 tons per hour capacity of the machine as stated in the lease contract, the machine could only process 5 tons of rocks and stones per hour. They then demanded that the petitioner make good the stipulation in the lease contract. Sy Bang stopped payment on the remaining checks they had issued to the petitioner.
As a consequence of the non-payment, Filinvest extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage.
Issue:
WON the real transaction was lease or sale? SALE ON INSTALLMENTS.
Held:
The real intention of the parties should prevail. The nomenclature of the agreement cannot change its true essence, i.e., a sale on installments. It is basic that a contract is what the law defines it and the parties intend it to be, not what it is called by the parties. It is apparent here that the intent of the parties to the subject contract is for the so-called rentals to be the installment payments. Upon the completion of the payments, then the rock crusher, subject matter of the contract, would become the property of the private respondents. This form of agreement has been criticized as a lease only in name.
Sellers desirous of making conditional sales of their goods, but who do not wish openly to make a bargain in that form, for one reason or another, have frequently resorted to the device of making contracts in the form of leases either with options to the buyer to purchase for a small consideration at the end of term, provided the so-called rent has been duly paid, or with stipulations that if the rent throughout the term is paid, title shall thereupon vest in the lessee. It is obvious that such transactions are leases only in name. The so-called rent must necessarily be regarded as payment of the price in installments since the due payment of the agreed amount results, by the terms of bargain, in the transfer of title to the lessee.
Indubitably, the device contract of lease with option to buy is at times resorted to as a means to circumvent Article 1484, particularly paragraph (3) thereof.Through the set-up, the vendor, by retaining ownership over the property in the guise of being the lessor, retains, likewise, the right to repossess the same, without going through the process of foreclosure, in the event the vendee-lessee defaults in the payment of the installments. There arises therefore no need to constitute a chattel mortgage over the movable sold. More important, the vendor, after repossessing the property and, in effect, canceling the contract of sale, gets to keep all the installments-cum-rentals already paid.
Even if there was a contract of sale, Filinvest is still not liable because Sy Bang is presumed to be more knowledgeable, if not experts, on the machinery subject of the contract, they should not therefore be heard now to complain of any alleged deficiency of the said machinery. It was Sy Bang who was negligent, not Filinvest. Further, Sy Bang is precluded to complain because he signed a Waiver of Warranty.
VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
LADLAD vs. VELASCO
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
Facts:
Beltran Petition:
On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a “State of National Emergency.” Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested.
He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. Inquest prosecutor found probable cause.
BASIS: joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally.
He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ state prosecutors.
The inquest was based on two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy director. The letters contained results of CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, et al as “leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause.
Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that such inquest was void.
Ladlad and Maza petitions:
Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion.
Basis of the PI: results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest.
During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor, gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes to media members present during the proceedings.
Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’ case, and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, they contend that the PI was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112 Sec3.
Issues:
1. WON the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? NO.
2. WON there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? NO.
3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? YES.
Held:
1)
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.
2)
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.
3)
The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall “issue a subpoena to the respondents.” Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 “to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments.”
During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the PI.
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
Facts:
Beltran Petition:
On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a “State of National Emergency.” Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested.
He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. Inquest prosecutor found probable cause.
BASIS: joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally.
He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ state prosecutors.
The inquest was based on two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy director. The letters contained results of CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, et al as “leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause.
Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that such inquest was void.
Ladlad and Maza petitions:
Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion.
Basis of the PI: results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest.
During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor, gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes to media members present during the proceedings.
Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’ case, and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, they contend that the PI was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112 Sec3.
Issues:
1. WON the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? NO.
2. WON there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? NO.
3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? YES.
Held:
1)
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.
2)
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.
3)
The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall “issue a subpoena to the respondents.” Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 “to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments.”
During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the PI.
MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS vs. ABELARDO B. LICAROS, G.R. No. 150656 April 29, 2003
ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS vs. LICAROS
G.R. No. 150656 April 29, 2003
Summons.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
Facts:
Abelardo and Margarita were lawfully married. Marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board. Margarita then left for the United States with her children. She filed with the courts of California a petition to divorce her husband, and it was granted.
Abelardo and Margarita executed an “Agreement of Separation of Properties”, which was duly granted by the RTC Makati.
Meanwhile, Abelardo commenced the proceeding on the voiding his marriage with Margarita on account of psychological incapacity. As Margarita was in the US, Abelardo initially moved that summons be served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. An Officer’s return was duly submitted declaring the completion of the service of summons. Finally, the marriage was declared void through Article 36 Family Code by the RTC.
Margarita appeared before the Consulate Office in San Francisco to sign the agreement on separation of property. Abelardo allegedly threatened to cut off all financial and material support to their children if Margarita did not sign the documents.
9 years later, Margarita contested such declaration of nullity of marriage on account of extrinsic fraud and questioned the court that it did not acquire jurisdiction over her, hence such decision is void and ineffectual.
Issue:
WON Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo? YES
WON there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo of the Petition for Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties? NO
Held:
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.
Jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts made a clear factual finding that there was proper summons by publication effected through the Department of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court. Thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring the marriage a nullity.
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1)when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode.
On the Issue of Fraud: A meticulous perusal of the Petition and Agreement readily shows that Margarita signed the same on the proper space after the prayer and on the portion for the verification of the petition. In the instant case, Margarita acknowledged the Agreement before Consul Cortez. The certificate of acknowledgment signed by Consul Cortez states that Margarita personally appeared before him and “acknowledged before me that SHE executed the same of her own free will and deed.” Thus, there is a prima facie presumption that Margarita freely and voluntarily executed the Agreement. Margarita has failed to rebut this prima facie presumption with clear and convincing proof of coercion on the part of Abelardo.
G.R. No. 150656 April 29, 2003
Summons.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
Facts:
Abelardo and Margarita were lawfully married. Marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board. Margarita then left for the United States with her children. She filed with the courts of California a petition to divorce her husband, and it was granted.
Abelardo and Margarita executed an “Agreement of Separation of Properties”, which was duly granted by the RTC Makati.
Meanwhile, Abelardo commenced the proceeding on the voiding his marriage with Margarita on account of psychological incapacity. As Margarita was in the US, Abelardo initially moved that summons be served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. An Officer’s return was duly submitted declaring the completion of the service of summons. Finally, the marriage was declared void through Article 36 Family Code by the RTC.
Margarita appeared before the Consulate Office in San Francisco to sign the agreement on separation of property. Abelardo allegedly threatened to cut off all financial and material support to their children if Margarita did not sign the documents.
9 years later, Margarita contested such declaration of nullity of marriage on account of extrinsic fraud and questioned the court that it did not acquire jurisdiction over her, hence such decision is void and ineffectual.
Issue:
WON Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo? YES
WON there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo of the Petition for Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties? NO
Held:
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.
Jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts made a clear factual finding that there was proper summons by publication effected through the Department of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court. Thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring the marriage a nullity.
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1)when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode.
On the Issue of Fraud: A meticulous perusal of the Petition and Agreement readily shows that Margarita signed the same on the proper space after the prayer and on the portion for the verification of the petition. In the instant case, Margarita acknowledged the Agreement before Consul Cortez. The certificate of acknowledgment signed by Consul Cortez states that Margarita personally appeared before him and “acknowledged before me that SHE executed the same of her own free will and deed.” Thus, there is a prima facie presumption that Margarita freely and voluntarily executed the Agreement. Margarita has failed to rebut this prima facie presumption with clear and convincing proof of coercion on the part of Abelardo.
Friday, December 10, 2010
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
Sunday, October 17, 2010
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.
HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.
HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER, GR No. 132344. February 17, 2000.
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, VS. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent
GR No. 132344. February 17, 2000.
FACTS:
Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination.
In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated.
On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations.
He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.
RULING:
In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and pain.
Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with modification.
GR No. 132344. February 17, 2000.
FACTS:
Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination.
In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated.
On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations.
He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.
RULING:
In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and pain.
Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with modification.
Sunday, September 26, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in the States – that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.”
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in the States – that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.”
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.
Saturday, September 25, 2010
Estrada v. Disierto, [G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001] 253 SCRA 452
Estrada v. Disierto,
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]
253 SCRA 452
FACTS: Following the aborted impeachment trial & the resignation of majority of the members of the Cabinet & the defection of the military & the police, at about noon of Jan. 20, 2001, V-pres Arroyo was sworn into office as Pres. of the Phil., while Pres. Estrada w/ his family left Malacanang. On the same day, however, Pres. Estrada wrote a letter to the Senate stating that he was unable to exercise the powers of the office of the Presidency & the operation of the Consti, the V-pres shall be Acting Pres.
ISSUE: Is the Pres. only temporarily unable to act as Pres?
RULING: NO. On Jan. 20, 2001, despite receipt of the letter, the House issued a resolution supporting the assumption of Arroyoi as Pres. Likewise, on Feb. 7, it confirmed the nomination by Pres. Arroyo of Sen. Guingona as V-Pres. On the same day, the Senate also confirmed the nomination. The Senate on Feb. 8, issued a resolution confirming the existence of a vacancy in the Senate brought about by the nomination of Sen. Guingona & urging the COMELEC to fill the vacancy. Finally, both Houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by Pres. Arroyo. It is therefore clear that Congress has recognized Arroyo as the Pres., & that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary. In the face of this determination by a co-equal branch, the court is w/out authority to review. It is a pol’l question, w/c cannot be decided by the Court w/out transgressing the princ. of separation of powers.
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]
253 SCRA 452
FACTS: Following the aborted impeachment trial & the resignation of majority of the members of the Cabinet & the defection of the military & the police, at about noon of Jan. 20, 2001, V-pres Arroyo was sworn into office as Pres. of the Phil., while Pres. Estrada w/ his family left Malacanang. On the same day, however, Pres. Estrada wrote a letter to the Senate stating that he was unable to exercise the powers of the office of the Presidency & the operation of the Consti, the V-pres shall be Acting Pres.
ISSUE: Is the Pres. only temporarily unable to act as Pres?
RULING: NO. On Jan. 20, 2001, despite receipt of the letter, the House issued a resolution supporting the assumption of Arroyoi as Pres. Likewise, on Feb. 7, it confirmed the nomination by Pres. Arroyo of Sen. Guingona as V-Pres. On the same day, the Senate also confirmed the nomination. The Senate on Feb. 8, issued a resolution confirming the existence of a vacancy in the Senate brought about by the nomination of Sen. Guingona & urging the COMELEC to fill the vacancy. Finally, both Houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by Pres. Arroyo. It is therefore clear that Congress has recognized Arroyo as the Pres., & that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary. In the face of this determination by a co-equal branch, the court is w/out authority to review. It is a pol’l question, w/c cannot be decided by the Court w/out transgressing the princ. of separation of powers.
Friday, September 24, 2010
Oh Cho vs Director of Lands G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946
Oh Cho vs Director of Lands
G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946
FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not Oh Cho had title
Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration
HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.
G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946
FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not Oh Cho had title
Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration
HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.
Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995
Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995
246 SCRA 511
FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together with the following conditions:
a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and any income from that land shall be put in the fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez Campus Fund”.
However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance & damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions. The heirs also argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land owned by the latter.
Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed.
ISSUE:
1) WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of petitioner’s certificate of title without a fixed period when to comply with such conditions? YES
2) WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO
HELD:
1)
Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is such a resolutory one. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may be revoked & all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.
More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
2)
Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature & circumstance it can be inferred that the period was intended, the court may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith & such period has arrived. However, this general rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different set of circumstances existing more than a reasonable period of 50yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality & would serve no purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission before the court unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance there is no more obstacle for the court to decree recission.
G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995
246 SCRA 511
FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together with the following conditions:
a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and any income from that land shall be put in the fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez Campus Fund”.
However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance & damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions. The heirs also argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land owned by the latter.
Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed.
ISSUE:
1) WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of petitioner’s certificate of title without a fixed period when to comply with such conditions? YES
2) WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO
HELD:
1)
Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is such a resolutory one. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may be revoked & all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.
More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
2)
Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature & circumstance it can be inferred that the period was intended, the court may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith & such period has arrived. However, this general rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different set of circumstances existing more than a reasonable period of 50yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality & would serve no purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission before the court unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance there is no more obstacle for the court to decree recission.
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc.
G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009
Facts:
Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI), operator of Dream Broadcsating System, delivers a digital direct-to-home (DTH) television satellite to its subscribers all over the Philippines, was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act 8630 and was given a Provisional Authority by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to install, operate and maintain a nationwide DTH satellite service. When it commenced operations, it offered as part of its program line-up, together with other paid premium program channels, ABS-CBN Channels 2 and 23, NBN, Channel 4, ABC, Channel 5, GMA, Channel 7, RPN, Channel 9, and IBC, Channel 13, pursuant to Memorandum Circular 4-08-88 which mandated all cable television system operators, operating within the Grade “A” and “B” CONTOURS to carry out the television signals of the authorized television broadcast stations.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN), a licensed television and radio broadcasting network, demanded PMSI to cease and desist from “rebroadcasting” Channels 2 and 23. In its reply, PMSI contended that the “rebroadcasting” was in accordance with the authority granted by NTC under its obligations under NTC MC 4-08-88.
Negotiations were ensued between the parties in an effort to reach a settlement; however, the same was terminated by ABS-CBN allegedly due to PMSI’s inability to ensure the prevention of illegal “retransmission” and further “rebroadcast” of its signals, as well as the adverse effect of the rebroadcasts on the business operations of its regional television stations.
ABS-CBN filed with the Intellectual Property Rights Office (IPO) a complaint for “Violation of Laws Involving Property Rights, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction” alleging that PMSI’s unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 infringed on its broadcasting rights and copyright. The TRO was granted by the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of IPO. PMSI, pursuant to the TRO, suspended the retransmission of PMSI of Channels 2 and 23 and likewise filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of PMSI and reversed the decision of the BLA. ABS-CBN filed its appeal however it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, ABS-CBN’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
1. Whether or not PMSI violated the Laws on Property Rights.
2. Whether or not the issuance MC 4-08-88 by the NTC is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Held:
1. NO. PMSI did not violate the Laws on Property Rights because it is not engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23. Rebroadcasting has been defined as “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting organization.” It is also “the transmission by wireless means for the public reception of sounds or of images or of representations thereof; such transmission by satellite is also ‘broadcasting’ where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its consent.” PMSI is only engaged in the carrying of signals of ABS-CBN coming from ABS-CBN and transmitting signals. PMSI is not the origin nor does it claim to be the origin of the programs broadcasted by the ABS-CBN. PMSI did not make and transmit on its own but merely carried the existing signals of the ABS-CBN. When PMSI subscribers view ABS-CBN’s programs in Channels 2 and 23, they know that the origin thereof was the ABS-CBN.
The nature of broadcasting is to scatter the signals in its widest area of coverage as possible. On this score, it may be said that making public means that accessibility is undiscriminating as long as it is within the range of the transmitter and equipment of the broadcaster. That the medium through which the PMSI carries the ABS-CBN’s signal, that is via satellite, does not diminish the fact that it operates and functions as a cable television. It remains that the PMSI’s transmission of signals via its DTH satellite television service cannot be considered within the purview of broadcasting.
Furthermore, there is no rebroadcasting on the part of the PMSI of the ABS-CBM’s programs on Channels 2 and 23, as defined under the Rome Convention, which defines rebroadcasting as “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting organization.” ABS-CBN creates and transmits its own signals; PMSI merely carries such signals which the viewers receive in its unaltered form. PMSI does not produce, select, or determine the programs to be shown in Channels 2 and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself off as the origin or author of such programs. Insofar as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely retransmits the same in accordance with Memorandum Circular 04-08-88. With regard to its premium channels, it buys the channels from content providers and transmits on an as-is basis to its viewers. Clearly, PMSI does not perform the functions of a broadcasting organization; thus, it cannot be said that it is engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
Therefore, the retransmission of ABS-CBN’s signals by PMSI – which functions essentially as a cable television – does not constitute rebroadcasting in violation of the former’s intellectual property rights under the IP Code.
2. YES. The law on copyright is not absolute. The carriage of ABS-CBN’s signals by virtue of the must-carry rule in Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 is under the direction and control of the government though the NTC which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and control telecommunications and broadcast services/facilities in the Philippines. The imposition of the must-carry rule is within the NTC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities in these activities whenever the Commission finds it reasonably feasible.
The “Must-Carry Rule” is in consonance with the principles and objectives underlying Executive Order No. 436, to wit:
The Filipino people must be given wider access to more sources of news, information, education, sports event and entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass media and afforded television programs to attain a well informed, well-versed and culturally refined citizenry and enhance their socio-economic growth.
Moreover, radio and television waves are mere franchised which may be reasonably burdened with some form of public service. It is a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.”
The must carry rule is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. It favors both broadcasting organizations and the public. It prevents cable television companies from excluding broadcasting organization especially in those places not reached by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs available to city viewers. In fact, this Office finds the rule more burdensome on the part of the cable television companies. The latter carries the television signals and shoulders the costs without any recourse of charging. On the other hand, the signals that are carried by cable television companies are dispersed and scattered by the television stations and anybody with a television set is free to pick them up.
G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009
Facts:
Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI), operator of Dream Broadcsating System, delivers a digital direct-to-home (DTH) television satellite to its subscribers all over the Philippines, was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act 8630 and was given a Provisional Authority by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to install, operate and maintain a nationwide DTH satellite service. When it commenced operations, it offered as part of its program line-up, together with other paid premium program channels, ABS-CBN Channels 2 and 23, NBN, Channel 4, ABC, Channel 5, GMA, Channel 7, RPN, Channel 9, and IBC, Channel 13, pursuant to Memorandum Circular 4-08-88 which mandated all cable television system operators, operating within the Grade “A” and “B” CONTOURS to carry out the television signals of the authorized television broadcast stations.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN), a licensed television and radio broadcasting network, demanded PMSI to cease and desist from “rebroadcasting” Channels 2 and 23. In its reply, PMSI contended that the “rebroadcasting” was in accordance with the authority granted by NTC under its obligations under NTC MC 4-08-88.
Negotiations were ensued between the parties in an effort to reach a settlement; however, the same was terminated by ABS-CBN allegedly due to PMSI’s inability to ensure the prevention of illegal “retransmission” and further “rebroadcast” of its signals, as well as the adverse effect of the rebroadcasts on the business operations of its regional television stations.
ABS-CBN filed with the Intellectual Property Rights Office (IPO) a complaint for “Violation of Laws Involving Property Rights, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction” alleging that PMSI’s unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 infringed on its broadcasting rights and copyright. The TRO was granted by the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of IPO. PMSI, pursuant to the TRO, suspended the retransmission of PMSI of Channels 2 and 23 and likewise filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of PMSI and reversed the decision of the BLA. ABS-CBN filed its appeal however it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, ABS-CBN’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
1. Whether or not PMSI violated the Laws on Property Rights.
2. Whether or not the issuance MC 4-08-88 by the NTC is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Held:
1. NO. PMSI did not violate the Laws on Property Rights because it is not engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23. Rebroadcasting has been defined as “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting organization.” It is also “the transmission by wireless means for the public reception of sounds or of images or of representations thereof; such transmission by satellite is also ‘broadcasting’ where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its consent.” PMSI is only engaged in the carrying of signals of ABS-CBN coming from ABS-CBN and transmitting signals. PMSI is not the origin nor does it claim to be the origin of the programs broadcasted by the ABS-CBN. PMSI did not make and transmit on its own but merely carried the existing signals of the ABS-CBN. When PMSI subscribers view ABS-CBN’s programs in Channels 2 and 23, they know that the origin thereof was the ABS-CBN.
The nature of broadcasting is to scatter the signals in its widest area of coverage as possible. On this score, it may be said that making public means that accessibility is undiscriminating as long as it is within the range of the transmitter and equipment of the broadcaster. That the medium through which the PMSI carries the ABS-CBN’s signal, that is via satellite, does not diminish the fact that it operates and functions as a cable television. It remains that the PMSI’s transmission of signals via its DTH satellite television service cannot be considered within the purview of broadcasting.
Furthermore, there is no rebroadcasting on the part of the PMSI of the ABS-CBM’s programs on Channels 2 and 23, as defined under the Rome Convention, which defines rebroadcasting as “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting organization.” ABS-CBN creates and transmits its own signals; PMSI merely carries such signals which the viewers receive in its unaltered form. PMSI does not produce, select, or determine the programs to be shown in Channels 2 and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself off as the origin or author of such programs. Insofar as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely retransmits the same in accordance with Memorandum Circular 04-08-88. With regard to its premium channels, it buys the channels from content providers and transmits on an as-is basis to its viewers. Clearly, PMSI does not perform the functions of a broadcasting organization; thus, it cannot be said that it is engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
Therefore, the retransmission of ABS-CBN’s signals by PMSI – which functions essentially as a cable television – does not constitute rebroadcasting in violation of the former’s intellectual property rights under the IP Code.
2. YES. The law on copyright is not absolute. The carriage of ABS-CBN’s signals by virtue of the must-carry rule in Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 is under the direction and control of the government though the NTC which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and control telecommunications and broadcast services/facilities in the Philippines. The imposition of the must-carry rule is within the NTC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities in these activities whenever the Commission finds it reasonably feasible.
The “Must-Carry Rule” is in consonance with the principles and objectives underlying Executive Order No. 436, to wit:
The Filipino people must be given wider access to more sources of news, information, education, sports event and entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass media and afforded television programs to attain a well informed, well-versed and culturally refined citizenry and enhance their socio-economic growth.
Moreover, radio and television waves are mere franchised which may be reasonably burdened with some form of public service. It is a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.”
The must carry rule is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. It favors both broadcasting organizations and the public. It prevents cable television companies from excluding broadcasting organization especially in those places not reached by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs available to city viewers. In fact, this Office finds the rule more burdensome on the part of the cable television companies. The latter carries the television signals and shoulders the costs without any recourse of charging. On the other hand, the signals that are carried by cable television companies are dispersed and scattered by the television stations and anybody with a television set is free to pick them up.
Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.
TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?
RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?
RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.
Sunday, September 19, 2010
CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
MATEO CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.
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